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Competitive Pressure and the Adoption of Complementary
Innovations
By TOBIAS KRETSCHMER, EUGENIO J. MIRAVETE, AND JOSÉ C. PERNÍAS￿
Liberalization of the European automobile distribution system in 2002
limits the ability of manufacturers to impose vertical restraints, lead-
ing to a substantial increase in competitive pressure among dealers.
We estimate an equilibrium model of profit maximization to evaluate
how dealers change their innovation adoption strategies following the
elimination of exclusive territories. Using French data we evaluate the
existence of complementarities between the adoption of software appli-
cations and the scale of production. Firms view these innovations as
substitutes and concentrate their effort in one type of software as they
expand their scale of production. Results are robust to the existence of
unobserved heterogeneity. (JEL: C35, L86, O31).
Keywords: Competitive Pressure, Complementarity, Interdependent In-
novations.
The question of how the intensity of competition in a market affects firm incentives
to improve their products and/or reduce unit costs is a long-standing one in economics.
As continued innovation ultimately determines the growth possibilities of an economy,
policies aimed at increasing the (static) competitiveness of a market also have to be eval-
uated considering their impact on long-term innovativeness of a sector or an economy.
Since incentives to innovate depend on the rents expected by an innovative firm, there
has been a lively debate as to which market structure is most conducive to innovative
behavior. Much of this debate has focused on a single dimension of innovative activity
despite innovation typically being a complex process involving multiple decisions and
stages. Our paper contributes to this debate by addressing some of these aspects. It
aims to capture the third part of the Schumpeterian trilogy —the diffusion or adoption of
innovations— and recognizes that potential adopters of innovations can choose among
different innovations.
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We limit our study to a particular industry setting, the French car dealer industry, and
consider the adoption of two different software technologies, triggered by a change in
regulation in the industry aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the automobile re-
tail distribution system. This is interesting for several reasons. First, existing studies
pay little attention to the “users” of an innovation. Thus, while we would not typically
think of car dealers as innovators in the software industry, the ultimate contribution of
information and communication technologies (ICT) on economic growth will depend on
the extent to which they diffuse throughout the economy. Second, the adoption of differ-
ent software technologies may be “interdependent.” That is, adoption of one technology
may make the adoption of others more attractive if they are complements, or adoption
of one may foreclose adoption of another if they are substitutes in their functionality
or if the firm’s budget constraint does not permit adoption of both. Third, rather than
relying on variations across different industries with unobserved structural differences,
we capture a change in competitive intensity through a regulatory regime change “in a
single industry.” To our knowledge, this is the first time that the effect of competition
has been measured in this way rather than pooling heterogeneous industries or countries
with different numbers of competitors.
What is the effect of an increase in competitive pressure on innovation? How is com-
petitive pressure transmitted if firms choose multiple strategies simultaneously? Our
approach to answering these questions builds on four basic pillars: (i) we distinguish be-
tween two potential innovations to be adopted: human resource management software,
HR, and applications development software, APPS; (ii) we allow firms to make innova-
tion adoption decisions simultaneously with other strategies, most importantly the scale
of production; (iii) we let these strategies generate return synergies (either positive or
negative) when used jointly; and (iv) our estimations control for the possibility that un-
observable factors drive the observed correlations among firms’ decision variables.
We distinguish two types of software innovations, APPS and HR software. Joseph A.
Schumpeter (1934) argued that market power favors cost reducing innovations because
larger firms may enjoy economies of scale while Kenneth J. Arrow (1962) envisioned
competitive environments as providing the right incentives to adopt demand enhanc-
ing innovations that help firms effectively differentiate their product offerings. Hence,
many theoretical models arrive at conflicting predictions regarding the effect of market
structure on the innovativeness of firms. In his overview, Richard Gilbert (2006) argues
that competition may reduce the incentive to innovate if intellectual property rights are
nonexclusive but will foster innovation if they are exclusive. Armin Schmutzler (2010)
identifies the countervailing effect of own demand shifts following a competitor adopting
a cost-reducing innovation if products are complements, although the effect becomes re-
inforcing if they are substitutes. Finally (although this review is not exhaustive), Xavier
Vives (2008) stresses that incentives to innovate in competitive or monopolistic settings
depend on whether entry is free or restricted. Not surprisingly therefore, Gilbert (2006,
§I) notes that “. . . empirical studies rarely account for the many factors that the the-
ory suggests should be significant determinants of innovative activity.” Indeed, Gilbert
(2006, §II) acknowledges that “it is not that we don’t have a model of market structure
and R&D, but rather that we have many models and it is important to know which model
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is appropriate for each market context.” Consequently, rather than pooling data across
industries and countries, our empirical approach focuses on a specific industry to avoid
these criticisms.1
Innovations are only one of the many strategies that firms choose together with pro-
duction, pricing, advertising, et cetera. Following Paul R. Milgrom and John Roberts
(1990), we treat firms as organizational systems where several decisions are made in a
coordinated manner. Firms will then benefit from taking into account the potential syner-
gies that one strategy may have on the returns to other strategies. The scale of production
is typically an explanatory variable for innovation activities in evaluating whether larger
firms have an advantage over small ones in developing and adopting innovations, and
thus supporting or refuting the Schumpeterian hypothesis.2 However, the minimum ef-
ficient scale of production may change with the adoption of innovations. This issue has
far more important consequences than just dealing with the potential endogeneity bias
of treating the scale of production as exogenous.3 Actually, (positive or negative) com-
plementarities may also exist across scale and innovation adoption strategies. Through
such complementarities, competition may not only directly affect the returns to inno-
vate, but also lead to changes in the optimal scale of production triggering more (or less)
innovations of each kind.
To account for all these different aspects of innovative activity our econometric model
adopts the setup of Eugenio J. Miravete and José C. Pernías (2006). We use a flexible
functional form to accommodate discrete strategies such as APPS and HR software adop-
tion in addition to the contemporaneous scale of production and the outcome (profits) of
any other unobserved strategies. This flexible approach let the data determine whether
the profit function is supermodular in all or some of the choice variables, thus leading to
the existence of complementarities among the appropriate strategies.4 We also allow for
the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in the form of unobserved returns to the firms’
1To identify the effect of competitive pressure, researchers have used data sets that include several industries with
different degrees of competition, or the same industry across different countries. A general concern with these approaches
is that econometric models fail to be closely linked to the institutional features of any industry in particular and results
are suspicious of being driven by aggregation across industries and countries. For instance, Philippe Aghion, Richard W.
Blundell, Rachel Griffith, Peter Howitt and Susan Prantl (2004) use a micro-level panel data of U.K. firms from several
industries to evaluate the effect of foreign entry on domestic patenting decisions; Irene Bertschek (1995) analyzes how
imports and inward foreign direct investment affects product and process innovation across industries in West Germany;
Wendy Carlin, Mark E. Schaffer and Paul Seabright (2004) evaluate the innovation performance of several State owned
firms in twenty-four transition countries; and James M. MacDonald (1994) studies how the rate of growth of labor
productivity changes with import penetration using data from ninety-four industries in the 1972–1987 period. Two
notable exceptions are the works of José E. Galdón-Sánchez and James A. Schmitz (2002), who make use of a well
defined natural experiment in the iron-ore market, and Richard W. Blundell, Rachel Griffith and John Van Reenen (1999),
who make use of lagged information in a panel data estimation to control for the endogeneity and simultaneity of R&D
expenditures and market structure.
2Wesley M. Cohen and Steven Klepper (1996) consider the theoretical relationship between firm size and type of
innovation although functional form assumptions drive many of the testable implications. Most importantly, scale is
treated as an exogenous variable in their econometric specification.
3Thomas J. Holmes, David K. Levine and James A. Schmitz (2008) argue that it is precisely this simultaneity what
leads monopolistic firms to have a lower incentive to adopt innovations than competitive ones. The reason is that adopting
a cost-reducing innovation requires a temporary reduction in scale —“switchover disruptions” in their terminology— and
since monopolies forego larger rents with every unit temporarily lost than competitive firms, they tend to postpone such
innovation decisions.
4Using a flexible functional form aims at avoiding misspecification arising from restrictive functional forms that
cannot accommodate certain innovation patterns. See Vives (2008, §III(iii)).
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strategies, which are freely correlated with each other. We derive the optimal scale and
innovation strategies from maximizing this profit function and employ an equilibrium
approach to estimate the model.
We want to evaluate the impact of competitive pressure on the adoption of different
kinds of innovations and identify how this effect is transmitted within a single industry.
Our approach to account for an increase in competitive pressure is to use an exogenous
shift in regulatory regime, the passing of E.U. Regulation 1400/2002 which affects the
nature of competition but not the appropriability of the rents of innovation.5 This ex-
ogenous regulatory shift of the automobile distribution system in Europe facilitates entry
(mostly of Asian manufacturers) and more aggressive commercial practices in the auto-
mobile dealership industry after 2002. Essentially, this regulation had the unanticipated
effect of removing exclusive territories from the set of allowed vertical restraints be-
tween automobile manufacturers and dealers. Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz (1995)
show that this makes manufacturers believe they face more elastic demand, thus induc-
ing a decrease in equilibrium prices and manufacturers’ profits. Further, downstream
dealers find their monopoly rents reduced and compete more fiercely with other dealers
in neighboring markets. We therefore argue that such liberalization increases inter- and
intra-brand competition and affects how competitive the market for dealers is, which in
turn may affect the incentive to adopt an innovation.
Our results show that the direct effect of increasing competitive pressure is to increase
dealers’ sales and the likelihood of adopting HR software. Moreover, we document the
existence of complementarity effects. Liberalization of the automobile distribution in-
dustry in France leads to an increase in optimal dealer scale, which in turn facilitates
the adoption of APPS software but not HR software. However, there is a strong negative
complementarity between APPS and HR software innovations. Thus, software innova-
tions appear to be substitutes and dealers specialize in adopting only one of the two,
most likely HR given the direct effect of increased competition on the return to adopting
it. These results are robust to the existence of unobserved returns to each strategy, as well
as the definition of local markets, their size, their urbanization, and any possible anticipa-
tion of the liberalization process that took place in the European automobile distribution
system in September 2002.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the institutional details
of the European automobile distribution system and its liberalization in September 2002.
This section also describes the adoption decisions we study and presents preliminary
evidence on the existence of complementarities. Section II introduces the econometric
model and discusses its coherence and identification. Section III reports the estimates
for different specifications, each successively relaxing restrictions on the existence of
complementarities and unobserved heterogeneity. We then conduct various specification
tests and discuss the estimation bias for an increase in competitive pressure if comple-
mentarities were ignored. We also evaluate the direct and indirect effects of an increase
in competitive pressure on all strategies by simulating firms’ profiles and evaluating them
5The direct effect of antitrust regulation on innovation is a largely unexplored area. An exception is the work of
Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston (2007) who consider how more or less protective policies toward entrants affect
the overall innovation in a model with successive generations of entrants who turn into incumbents and incumbents who
eventually leave the industry.
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at the parameter estimates and firm and market characteristics. Section IV concludes.
I. Data and Institutional Background
We study French car dealerships between 2000 and 2004. The change in E.U. reg-
ulation in September 2002 constitutes an interesting natural experiment that provides
us with an unusual measure of increased competitive pressure, as territorial exclusivity
was suddenly abandoned as permissible vertical restraint. While a change of regulation
was largely anticipated, its specific implementation (the effective abolishment of terri-
torial exclusivity) was not. This lets us study how an increase in competitive pressure
affects scale and different innovation choices, both directly on their associated returns,
and indirectly through the potential complementarities among all these strategies. This
section covers four issues regarding our dealer level data on output, software adoption,
and profits: (i) we review the institutional details surrounding the change in the regu-
latory framework of the automobile distribution system in Europe; (ii) we discuss how
the change in regulation translates into an increase in competitive pressure at the dealer
segment of the market; (iii) we describe the nature of software innovations and give in-
dicative evidence of the existence of complementarities among strategies; and (iv) we
provide some evidence that the change in innovation activity is mostly related to the
change in regulatory framework rather than to other likely causes.
A. Liberalization of the European Automobile Distribution System
For many years, vertical restraints in the automobile distribution industry were exempt
from antitrust enforcement as European authorities gave in repeatedly to the industry’s
demands.6 Regulation 1400/2002 aimed at increasing competition by “allow[ing] distrib-
utors [. . . ] to seize additional business opportunities.” After Regulation 1400/2002 was
passed shortly before September 2002, automobile manufacturers had to choose between
selectivity and territorial exclusivity in commercial relations with dealers. “Selectivity”
aims at imposing a minimum quality of service and allows automobile manufacturers to
require from dealers a minimum level of staff training, advertising, storage, and most
importantly the obligation to provide after-sales repair and maintenance services. “Ter-
ritorial Exclusivity” refers to the manufacturers’ right to allow only one dealer in a given
geographical area. Together, selectivity and territorial exclusivity reduce not only the
total number of dealers but also reduce opportunities for more efficient dealers to capture
larger market shares. After 2002, most manufacturers chose to enforce selective vertical
restraints only, which led dealers to open other domestic and foreign branches and to
intensify competition across markets.7
6This subsection draws on Randy Brenkers and Frank Verboven (2006, §1–2,8) and Frank Verboven (2008, §2.3), as
well as on the data collected by London Economics in its June 2006 report to the EC DG Competition on “Developments
in Car Retailing and After-Sales Markets Under Regulation No. 1400/2002.”
7Selectivity also restricts dealers to sell automobiles only to final consumers and not to non-authorized intermediaries
or dealers outside the manufacturers’ networks. Furthermore, under territorial exclusivity dealers, are not allowed to own
branches of their dealerships outside the exclusive territory and their advertising efforts should be aimed primarily at this
specific market. Only Suzuki, a very small player in the French automobile market, chose to enforce territorial exclusivity
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TABLE 1—SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
All periods Pre-Expiry Post-Expiry
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
xa 0:066 0:248 0:076 0:266 0:046 0:209
xh 0:171 0:376 0:160 0:367 0:192 0:395
xy 3:088 1:666 2:987 1:698 3:283 1:588
￿ 18:103 97:149 18:443 97:995 17:452 95:725
N 639 420 219
Means and standard deviations of endogenous variables by competition regime. In-
novation indicators are dummy variables. Scale is measured in logarithm of thou-
sands of euros while profits are measured in thousands of euros. N denotes the
number of dealers in each sample.
Is this change in regulation a good proxy for the increase in competitive pressure
among European automobile dealers? Expiration of Regulation 1475/95 was largely
predictable but the fact that manufacturers must choose between selectivity and territo-
rial exclusivity was not anticipated. Moreover, the change in regulation has little to do
with the innovation proneness of automobile retailers but rather with the retail price set-
ting mechanism. As Gilbert (2006, §III) recommends, this regime shift does not affect
determinants of innovations such as technological opportunity. Hence, years 2003 and
2004 (LIB dummy variable) identify the period where competition is more intense after
the liberalization of the European automobile distribution system.8
Table 1 presents basic descriptive statistics for our four endogenous variables across
the entire sample for pre- and post-expiry periods of the EU exemption: adoption of APPS
software (xa i ); adoption of HR software (xh i ); scale (xy i ); and accounting profits, (￿i )
capturing the effects of all strategies including others different than fxy i ; xa i ; xh ig. Note
the substantial increase in HR software adoption and scale of production after the new
regulatory framework is adopted. Similarly, there is an important reduction in the rate
of APPS software adoption and a slight decrease in profits consistent with the increased
competition argument.
B. Increase in Competitive Pressure
How does the removal of the exclusive territory restraint increase competition among
dealers? A short answer is that competition increases because they can now compete out-
side their limited initial territories. As they get in contact with other dealers of the same
brand they have to offer lower retail prices to final customers, reducing inter-regional
at the expense of selectivity. Hence, Suzuki dealers became free to sell to independent resellers that were not necessarily
in the manufacturers’ networks.
8It is interesting to note that France and Italy were among the latest markets to embrace the restructuring of their
automobile distribution networks. This makes France a better object of study than many other European countries where
this liberalization process was already on its way by the time the European regulation was adopted.
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price differences.9
A more elaborate answer incorporates the change in wholesale competition inflicted
by the change in regulation and how manufacturers’ behavior is altered once the market
in which dealers operate expands and downstream competition intensifies. The argument
is made explicit in the work of Rey and Stiglitz (1995), who show that exclusive terri-
tories are an effective tool to help manufacturers soften upstream competition but they
also serve to increase both retail and wholesale price. Their model of horizontally dif-
ferentiated products closely mimics the main features of the automobile industry. Within
an exclusive territory, retail prices of substitute goods are strategic complements and
thus an increase by one of the dealers triggers a retail price increase by competitors. In
equilibrium the competing manufacturers will charge a higher wholesale price to cap-
ture monopolistic rents, i.e., exclusive territories lead to weaker downstream intrabrand
competition, which in turn implies weaker upstream interbrand competition. Removing
the exclusive territory constraint produces the opposite effects. Absent exclusive territo-
ries, dealers account for demand potentially being diverted towards neighboring markets,
thus increasing downstream intrabrand competition. This change in competition regime
allows us to identify the effect of competitive pressure on the likelihood that dealers
adopt different innovations. We also know that interbrand competition intensifies among
manufacturers although we do not make use of it in our empirical analysis.10
This increase in competitiveness at the dealer level is a complex process that goes
beyond the simple removal of a vertical restraint and the ability to soften competition
among manufacturers. Until 2002 there were “main dealers” and “sub-dealers.” Main
dealers had contracts with car manufacturers while sub-dealers held contracts with a main
dealer, who supplied them with parts, vehicles, and technical support. After 2002 mostly
sub-dealers left the distribution network. In France the total number of dealerships fell
by 21 percent between 2002 and 2003 alone and 31 percent, from 18;202 to 12;512
between 2000 and 2004. Similarly, dealer density dropped from around 32 to just over
20 dealers per thousand inhabitants. This is the most important reduction of the size of
the dealer network and dealer density in any E.U. member state following the change in
regulatory framework, which led to an increase in sales per dealer captured in the third
row of Table 1.11
These observations may appear at odds with our claim that the removal of exclusive
territory restraint increases competitive pressure. However, note that the definition of rel-
evant market has changed and is not limited to the original exclusive territory.12 Indeed,
9Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Frank Verboven (2001) and Frank Verboven (1996) document the extensive use of price
discrimination in the automobile industry across European markets.
10Regulation 1400/2002 was also aimed at increasing competition and efficiency both at the manufacturer and the
retailer level. See Section 10 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002R1400:EN:NOT.
11See chapters 40 and 37, respectively, of “Developments in Car Retailing and After-Sales Markets under Regulation
No. 1400/2002,” Volume I, Final Report to EC DGCompetition by London Economics. European Communities, Brussels.
Sales increase in our sample by 10 percent between 2000–2002 and 2003–2004; a similar rate to the rest of the industry.
See European Car Distribution Handbook, HWB International, issues 2000 to 2005, Milford-on-Sea, U.K.
12Jan Boone (2000a) and Jan Boone (2000b) argue that even if the definition of the relevant market does not change,
a market configuration with fewer firms may lead to a more competitive outcome even without horizontal product differ-
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fewer firms compete more aggressively in larger markets, therefore limiting the ability to
raise prices and markups. Two more issues helped facilitate competition among brands
in the automobile distribution industry in Europe after September 2002: First, Asian
manufacturers entered by taking over locations abandoned by former sub-dealers; and
second, the proportion of multibrand retailers also increased in France from 10:2 percent
in 2000–2002 to 17:5 percent in 2003–2004. According to the assessment of Regulation
1400/2002, this “proliferation of multibrand dealerships represents a positive develop-
ment from the point of consumers.”13 In short, Regulation 1400/2002 increased “intra-
brand” competition by allowing dealers of the same brand to compete in each other’s
territory and “inter-brand” competition by relaxing the restriction that dealers only sell
one brand of car.
C. Software Adoption in Automobile Retailing
Data include innovation strategies, sales, and accounting profits of the “Motor Vehicle
Dealers” industry (SIC code 5511) in France from 2000 to 2004. Each cross-section
(year) includes a representative sample of automobile dealerships. We focus on the
French market because data are comprehensive, collected with a consistent methodol-
ogy, and available for a large number of well defined markets. French dèpartements
define areas with fairly homogeneous market conditions. In addition, the large num-
ber of dèpartements (about a hundred) lets us benefit from significant regional diversity.
Section V enumerates the data sources and describes the sampling methodology.
We study the adoption of two software packages, namely human resource manage-
ment software HR, and applications development software APPS. HR management soft-
ware refers to a range of software applications that regulate all the personnel related
data flow, such as tracking employees’ participation in benefits programs, administering
the recruiting process, and implementing human resource practices more efficiently. In
essence, HR software supports human resource processes that were previously adminis-
tered manually. This facilitates savings on administrative expenses, especially personnel.
For example, in the car dealer industry sales personnel is paid partly by commission, for
which an entry has to be made on the payroll every time a car sale is made. Variable xh i
accounts for the adoption of HR software in our econometric model.
APPS development software grew out of programming languages such as C++, Basic,
or Fortran with added functionality like debugging or requirements testing to facilitate
the development of own, customized software applications. APPS effectively provides
a user interface and toolbox for programmers.14 Adopting APPS development software
enables firms to develop IT infrastructure that can easily be scaled up to serve multiple
locations. For example, firm-specific advanced replenishment systems for spare parts
facilitates stocking different outlets and serving diverse consumer groups, enabling firms
entiation if firms are not equally efficient, so that more efficient firms are in a better position to draw demand away from
less efficient competitors, who may subsequently exit the industry.
13P. 90, “Developments in Car Retailing and After-Sales Markets under Regulation No. 1400/2002,” Volume I, Final
Report to EC DG Competition by London Economics. European Communities, Brussels.
14The most prominent examples of application development software are Microsoft’s Visual Basic at the low end and
Borland’s Delphi at the high end.
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TABLE 2—DISTRIBUTION OF INNOVATION PROFILES
All periods Pre-Expiry Post-Expiry
share Nxy N￿ share Nxy N￿ share Nxy N￿
None 77:2 2:98 20:1 77:1 2:88 20:6 77:2 3:19 19:0
Only APPS 5:8 3:44 5:0 6:9 3:37 5:2 3:7 3:70 4:1
Only HR 16:3 3:34 10:8 15:2 3:24 11:3 18:3 3:48 9:9
Both 0:8 5:54 74:9 0:7 5:62 64:9 0:9 5:41 90:0
Percentage of firms adopting every possible combination of innovations. Scale is measured in loga-
rithm of thousands of euros while profits are measured in thousands of euros.
to grow and increase revenues more easily. Such systems are typically developed in-
house with the help of APPS development software to incorporate the specifics of their
business.15 Further, internet applications prove critical not only in providing information
about models, but also scheduling test-drives, checking availability, and finding out about
financing conditions. A recent study indicates that 30 percent of French customers are
more likely to purchase a vehicle from a particular manufacturer if they are satisfied
with the features of its website.16 Thus, adopting APPS development software allow car
dealers to grow their revenues more easily and across different locations. Variable xa i
accounts for APPS innovation in our econometric model.
Firms decide on the scale of production xy i , measured as the logarithm of turnover
in thousands of euros, together with the adoption of APPS development software, xa i ,
and HR development software, xh i . The choice of these strategies together with other
unobserved ones determines the level of profits for each firm ￿i . We measure profits as
turnover minus remuneration and materials cost (again in thousands of euros). Is there
any evidence that the scale varies with the set of innovations adopted, i.e. that it is re-
ally an endogenous variable? Table 2 breaks down the distribution of innovation profiles
across competition regimes. For each innovation profile we also report the average scale
and profits of the corresponding subsample of firms. Most dealers do not engage in any
innovation strategy, but there is an overall change in innovation strategies after the lib-
eralization of the European automobile distribution system. Dealers narrow the scope of
their innovation profiles by further favoring HR over APPS innovations. Finally, substan-
tially larger dealers are more likely to engage in joint adoption of innovations. Therefore,
a model where the scale of production was treated as exogenous would be misspecified
in this case.
To complete our descriptive analysis, Table 3 reports Kendall’s ￿ coefficients of as-
sociation among the different strategies of firms and between each strategy and profits
before and after liberalization. These nonlinear correlation coefficients are useful to test
for the existence of unconditional complementarity, i.e., the outcome of a profit func-
15See 2007 report by Microfocus: “Tesco Creates a Common Operating Model for Quick Deployment,” available at
http://www.microfocus.com/000/Tesco\_highres\_US\_V2\_tcm21-15509.pdf.
16See the 2005 report by Capgemini: “Cars Online 04/05: Driving Growth Through Collaboration,” which is available
at http://www.capgemini.com/m/en/tl/pdf_Cars_Online_04_05__Driving_Growth_Through_Collaboration.pdf.
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TABLE 3—ASSOCIATION AMONG ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
xy ; xa xy ; xh xa; xh ￿; xy ￿; xa ￿; xh
All Periods 0:112￿￿￿ 0:019 ￿0:036 0:789￿￿￿ 0:121￿￿￿ 0:028
Pre-Expiry 0:131￿￿￿ 0:022 ￿0:052 0:789￿￿￿ 0:138￿￿￿ 0:030
Post-Expiry 0:090 ￿0:007 0:005 0:785￿￿￿ 0:106￿ 0:005
Kendall’s ￿ association coefficients. Significance levels are indicated with ￿ for p-values less than 0:1; ￿￿
for less than 0:05; and ￿￿￿ for less than 0:01.
tion being pairwise supermodular in each possible pair of strategies while ignoring all
other differences among firms.17 The coefficients show that larger firms are more likely
to adopt APPS software, especially before liberalization. Along the lines of the rela-
tions already discussed in Table 2, APPS and HR software appear to be substitutes, i.e.,
the profit function would be submodular in these two arguments, although this negative
association is not significant. Note that competition strengthens or weakens the comple-
mentarity/substitutability relations but never reverses the sign. Note further the strong
positive correlation between scale and profits, which also include the outcome of other
non-observable dealers’ strategies.
D. Causality
In this paper we argue that the change in regulation of vertical restraints in the Euro-
pean automobile industry increases competition among dealers thus triggering a change
in behavior that affects scale and innovation decisions among other strategies. We be-
lieve that this is a reasonable explanation consistent with the available data for other
industries and countries. We thus first compared the dynamics of software adoption in
similar industries in France that did not experience a regulatory change. Our limited
data suggest that the year-by-year change in APPS adoption was increasing in other re-
tail industries while decreasing in SIC code 5511, and that post-expiry of 1475/95, HR
adoption increased in SIC code 5511 while it decreased in other retail industries. Thus,
it would appear unlikely that changes in prices or profitability arising from sources other
than the expiry of the EU regulation led to such diverging outcomes in technologically
similar industries.
An alternative that avoids the effects of likely heterogeneity across industries regarding
the use of different strategies is to pool information from another country where the
E.U. regulation change has no effect. In an analysis similar to the one presented in
Table 5 below, we pool French and Norwegian data (Norway does not belong to the E.U.)
and find that sales in Norway in 2003-2004 (which defines the liberalization dummy
in our application) were not much different from those in 2000-2002. French dealers
17Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella (1990) first computed similar correlations to test for the existence of com-
plementarity although the theoretical foundation of this test is due to Bengt Holmström and Paul R. Milgrom (1994).
Eugenio J. Miravete and José C. Pernías (2010) show that such a simple correlation analysis cannot capture the effect of
complementarity when decision variables are, as in the present case, dichotomous.
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sold, on average, fewer vehicles than their Norwegian counterparts. However, the most
interesting result is the positive and highly significant effect of the dummy differentiating
the effect of liberalization in France and Norway. Its positive estimate indicates that the
output of French dealers increased after the removal of territorial exclusivity. Thus,
including Norway as a control group provides some reassurance that there is indeed
a structural change that follows the liberalization of the E.U. automobile distribution
system.18
II. Econometric Model
Our estimation approach fully implements the framework put forward by Susan C.
Athey and Scott Stern (1998). This is the first time the “adoption approach” (based on
innovation profiles of firms) and the “productivity approach” (based on the actual return
to each strategy) are integrated in a single estimation procedure. The specification of
a flexible, yet general, profit function lets us disentangle the effect of complementarity
from correlations among unobserved returns to each strategy.19
The econometric model builds on Miravete and Pernías (2006) with two important
points of departure. First, we do not explicitly distinguish whether different software
products are demand enhancing or cost reducing innovations. Thus, the profit function
becomes a black box that captures the total effect of all strategies employed by the firm,
therefore reducing the need for ad-hoc exclusion restrictions that help identify indepen-
dent shifts of demand or marginal cost functions.20 Second, the estimation makes use
of the information on profits associated with the scale decision and innovation profile
of each firm, therefore avoiding the need to normalize several parameters of the profit
function. Accounting profits are not normally employed in empirical studies. We in-
clude turnover in the same spirit as the productivity approach evaluates the effectiveness
of innovations by metrics such as output, exports, or labor productivity. Interestingly,
accounting profits are an aggregate indicator of overall returns, including those of other
unobserved strategies.
Software adoption indicators are dichotomous variables, something that adds to the
complexity of the estimation, but accurately reflects the discrete nature of innovation
adoption decisions. In addition, to deal with the important effects of unobserved re-
turns to each strategy we assume them to be jointly normally distributed so that we
can evaluate how the unobserved heterogeneity associated with implementing each strat-
egy, —i.e., unobserved, strategy specific returns— affects the profitability of the rest of
the strategies. As Athey and Stern (1998, §4.2) point out, allowing for an unrestricted
variance-covariance matrix of the distribution of these unobserved returns “provides a
18Results are available from the authors upon request.
19Susan C. Athey and Scott Stern (2002) and Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw and Giovanna Prennushi (1997) are
examples of the productivity approach while Miravete and Pernías (2006) is an example of the adoption approach. Bruno
Cassiman and Reinhilde Veugelers (2006) apply both approaches, although not jointly but separately, to study potential
complementarities between internal R&D and external knowledge acquisition.
20It is doubtful that we could build a meaningful economic model where we could credibly argue that, for instance,
APPS software innovation only shifts demand while HR software innovation only shifts marginal costs and further, for
instance, that population density could be excluded from the demand equation while per capita GDP could be excluded
from the marginal cost equation.
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parsimonious specification that still accommodates the main alternative hypothesis re-
garding complementarity among strategies and the role of unobserved heterogeneity.”
Thus, the identification of the model relies on the flexible functional form of the profit
function and an unrestricted multivariate normal distribution of the structural errors of
the model associated to the unobserved returns to each strategy of firms.
A. The Profit Function
We write the profit function of firm i as21
(1) ￿i .xa i ; xh i ; xy i / D ￿￿ C ￿￿ i C .￿a C ￿a i /xa iC
.￿h C ￿h i /xh i C .￿y C ￿y i /xy iC
ıahxa ixh i C ıayxa ixy i C ıhyxh ixy i ￿ .￿=2/x2y i :
This general profit function imposes very little structure on the underlying production
technology. It is quadratic in scale xy i and the adoption of software innovations is rep-
resented by two dichotomous variables, xa i and xh i . It also includes pairwise interac-
tion terms among all these strategies —parameters ıah, ıay , and ıhy—whose estimated
signs determine whether the profit function is supermodular or submodular in each pair
of strategies. No assumptions are made about these potentially complementarity relations
and our estimates will determine them regardless of whether the strategies are continu-
ous, such as scale, or discrete, as in the case of innovations. We envision firm i choosing
its scale and innovation profile to maximize the profit function ￿i .xa i ; xh i ; xy i /. For
the solution of this problem to be well defined we only need to assume that equation (1)
is concave on the xy i dimension.
An important goal of the econometric estimation is to determine whether the associ-
ations in Table 3 are due to the existence of complementarities, i.e., estimates of ıah,
ıay , or ıhy that are significantly different from zero, or alternatively, due to the exis-
tence of other unobserved elements of firms’ environments for which we do not have
information. The existence of returns .￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i / that are observed by firms
but not by econometricians explains why firms with identical observable characteristics
.￿a; ￿h; ￿y ; ￿￿/ may end up choosing different strategies .xa i ; xh i ; xy i / and reaching
different profit levels, ￿i . For this reason the return to each strategy, i.e., its direct impact
on profits, includes an observed component —￿a, ￿h, and ￿y— and an unobserved one
—￿a i , ￿h i , and ￿y i—to control for the possibility that unobservable features of firm or-
ganization and/or the innovation and production decisions lead to co-movements among
strategies which is only the result of not having more detailed information about the rel-
evant environment in which firms operate.22 Note also that there is an independent profit
21It could be questioned whether our model is appropriate, i.e., whether a dealer or a dealer group actually chooses
these strategies or if manufacturers make these choices for them. Manufacturers do not have any legal competence on
deciding over sales or any other decisions of dealers. Moreover in 2004, there were only 388 manufacturer owned dealers
out of 12,774 total dealers.
22These could be, for example, the flatness of the firm’s hierarchy of Timothy F. Bresnahan, Erik Brynjolfsson and
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contribution from other non-observable strategies of the firm. This separate term for the
profit contribution of all other strategy variables combined comprises an observed com-
ponent, ￿￿ and an unobserved one, ￿￿ i . They will be allowed to be freely correlated
with the rest of unobserved returns of the model.23
The rest of this section discusses how the available information suffices to identify the
key parameters of the model given the profit function (1) and a flexible distribution of the
structural errors .￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i /. We show that for any vector .￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i / of
unobserved returns to demand enhancing and cost reducing innovations, unobserved re-
turns to production scale, and the profit contribution of the rest of strategies, respectively,
there is a unique vector .xa i ; xh i ; xy i ;￿i / of optimal strategies and total profits that ra-
tionalizes the observed scale and innovation profile as profit maximizing behavior. We
estimate an equilibrium model in the sense that we derive the restrictions on the unob-
servables implied by profit maximizing behavior to obtain the parameter estimates from
the sample combinations of strategy profiles.
B. Scale choice





D ￿y C ￿y i C ıayxa i C ıhyxh i ￿ ￿xy i D 0:
From here, the optimal scale choice contingent on the innovation profile of the firm is
(3) x?y i .xa i ; xh i / D ￿￿1.￿y C ￿y i C ıayxa i C ıhyxh i /:
The sufficient condition for profit maximization requires that ￿ > 0, i.e., that profit func-
tion (1) is concave in xy i . Next, we write ￿?i .xa i ; xh i / D ￿i .xa i ; xh i ; x?y i .xa i ; xh i //
and after substituting the optimal scale (3) into the profit function (1) we get
(4) ￿?i .xa i ; xh i / D ￿￿ i C ￿￿ i C .￿a i C ￿a i /xa i C .￿h i C ￿h i /xh i C ıxa ixh i ;
where
￿￿ i D ￿￿ C .￿y C ￿y i /2=.2￿/;(5a)
￿a i D ￿a C ıay
￿
ıay=2C .￿y C ￿y i /
￿
=￿;(5b)
Lorin M. Hitt (2002) or certain management capabilities to realize the potential profits of combining firm strategies.
23The stochastic structure of equation (1) is what Athey and Stern (1998) label “Random Practice Model,” i.e., a
profit function where each strategy incorporates an unobservable return which, despite being freely correlated to each
other, they do not depend on other strategies of the firm. Thus, parameters affecting the cross-products of strategies
.ıah; ıay ; ıhy/, are non-stochastic. Alternatively, the “Random System Model” incorporates a common unobserved re-
turn to each combination of strategies. This latter specification is far more demanding as it requires sufficient realizations
of all potential combinations of innovation profiles for each combination of value of the explanatory variables included
in .ıah; ıay ; ıhy/, something that goes beyond the limits of our data.
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￿h i D ￿h C ıhy
￿
ıhy=2C .￿y C ￿y i /
￿
=￿;(5c)
ı D ıah C ıayıhy=￿:(5d)
C. Innovation profile choice
Once we have obtained the optimal scale as a function of innovations in equation (3),
we need to determine how the observed innovation profile identifies the innovation re-
lated parameters of the model. Firm i chooses its innovation profile to maximize profits.
Firms can adopt APPS software, in which case xa i D 1. Similarly, when they adopt
HR software, xh i D 1. Therefore, firm i chooses one of four innovation profiles: (i)
adoption of APPS innovation only, xa i D 1; xh i D 0; (ii) adoption of HR innovation
only, xa i D 0; xh i D 1; (iii) adoption of both innovations, xa i D 1; xh i D 1; and (iv)
adoption of no innovation at all, xa i D 0; xh i D 0. From equation (4), we can then
write the profits for each of the four innovation profiles as follows:
￿?.1; 1/ D ￿￿ i C ￿a i C ￿h i C ı C ￿￿ i C ￿a i C ￿h i ;(6a)
￿?.1; 0/ D ￿￿ i C ￿a i C ￿￿ i C ￿a i ;(6b)
￿?.0; 1/ D ￿￿ i C ￿h i C ￿￿ i C ￿h i ;(6c)
￿?.0; 0/ D ￿￿ i C ￿￿ i ;(6d)
which provide us with the restrictions on unobservables associated to each strategy pro-
file. Thus, if a firm engages in both innovation activities we have:
￿?.1; 1/ > ￿?.1; 0/;(7a)
￿?.1; 1/ > ￿?.0; 1/;(7b)
￿?.1; 1/ > ￿?.0; 0/:(7c)
These conditions imply that observing firm i adopting both innovations correspond to
the following restrictions on the unobserved returns to product and process innovation
.￿a i ; ￿h i /:
￿a i > ￿ ￿a i ￿ ı;(8a)
￿h i > ￿ ￿h i ￿ ı;(8b)
￿a i C ￿h i > ￿ ￿a i ￿ ￿h i ￿ ı:(8c)
We can repeat this analysis for all other innovation profiles. For simplicity, we apply
the following definitions:
￿s i D ￿h i C si￿a i ;(9)
qa i D 2xa i ￿ 1;(10)
qh i D 2xh i ￿ 1;(11)
si D qa iqh i :(12)
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The following notation generalizes inequality conditions (8a)–(8c). Let ￿i .xa i ; xh i /
denote the set of realizations of .￿a i ; ￿h i / for any given value of ￿y i such that they lead to
the observed choices of product and process innovation, .xa i ; xh i /. The set ￿i .xa i ; xh i /
is defined from the following three inequalities:24
qa i￿a i > ￿ qa i .￿a i C ıxh i /;(13a)
qh i￿h i > ￿ qh i .￿h i C ıxa i /;(13b)
qh i￿s i > ￿ qh i
￿
￿h i C ı=2C si .￿a i C ı=2/
￿
:(13c)
Figure 1 shows the shape of the ￿i .xa i ; xh i / regions for positive and negative values of
ı. Notice that these disjoint regions are defined by the observed and unobserved returns
associated to scale and innovations. Neither ￿￿ i nor ￿￿ appear in conditions (13a)–
(13c). However, both ￿y i and ￿y define these integration regions through ￿a i and ￿h i .
Further, as long as the profit function is increasing and concave in xy i , i.e., ￿ > 0 the
model is coherent in the sense that any given realization of the errors .￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i /
is associated unambiguously with a firm with given scale, innovation profile, and profit
level.25
The intuition of this coherence result goes as follows. First, observe that each re-
alization of .￿y i ; ￿a i ; ￿h i / is uniquely associated with a particular innovation profile
.xa i ; xh i / through conditions (13a)–(13c). Equation (3) then uniquely determines the
scale xy i . Finally, for any given realization of ￿￿ i , the observable direct profit con-
tribution of the rest of the strategies ￿￿ is determined by equation (1) as a residual
from observable profits after the contributions of scale and innovations are accounted
for. Thus, for a given realization of .￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i / there is a unique correspond-
ing vector .xa i ; xh i ; xy i ;￿i / that satisfies the profit maximization conditions for the
parameters .￿a; ￿h; ￿y ; ￿￿/.26
To estimate the model we assume that ￿i D .￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i /0 follows a tetravariate
normal distribution with zero means and standard deviations .￿a; ￿h; ￿y ; ￿￿/0. The joint
density of ￿i can be written as
















where ￿4.￿IR/ denotes the probability density function of a four-variate normal distri-
24Notice that the third restriction (8c) is non-binding when ı ￿ 0, as can be checked by adding the first two conditions
(8a) and (8b). Similarly, the last of these conditions is non-binding if siı ￿ 0.
25As Figure 1 shows, the areas of integration corresponding to each innovation profile are not rectangular unless
ı D 0. This situation is common in the entry literature. Both Steven T. Berry (1992) and Michael J. Mazzeo (2002) en-
counter non-rectangular integrations areas similar to those of Figure 1. They resort to simulation to estimate their models.
Miravete and Pernías (2006) make use of a Gauss-Legendre quadrature to evaluate the probabilities of each innovation
profile. Web Appendix A shows that a simple change of basis allows us to evaluate Prob Œ.￿a i ; ￿hi / 2 ￿i .xa i ; xhi /￿
as the sum of two bivariate normal integrals over two disjoint regions. If we were to consider numerous discrete strategies
this method would become impractical and we would also have to resort to simulations to estimate our model.
26Miravete and Pernías (2010, §2.3) discuss in detail the coherence of econometric models aimed at testing for the
existence of complementarities among dichotomous (innovation) strategies in the presence of unobservable heterogeneity
that influences the return to different strategies of firms.
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(a) ı > 0
￿a i
￿h i




￿i .1; 0/￿i .0; 0/
￿i .0; 1/
(b) ı < 0
￿a i
￿h i




￿i .1; 0/￿i .0; 0/
￿i .0; 1/
FIGURE 1. INNOVATION PROFILE DEFINING REGIONS
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bution with mean vector 0, unit variances, and correlation matrix
(15) R D
0BB@
1 ￿ah ￿ay ￿a￿
￿ah 1 ￿hy ￿h￿
￿ay ￿hy 1 ￿y￿
￿a￿ ￿h￿ ￿y￿ 1
1CCA :
Equation (3) and conditions (13a)–(13c), can be used to test for the existence and di-
rection of complementarities, as in Miravete and Pernías (2006). Making use of ac-
counting profits further enables us to estimate ￿ , all ￿-indexed parameters of the profit
function (1), and those of the multivariate distribution of unobservables. Working along
these lines, we construct the likelihood function of this model under the assumption that
.￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i / follows this unrestricted multivariate normal distribution in Web Ap-
pendix A. The model is empirically identified as our data includes all innovation profiles
in different proportions before and after the removal of the exclusive territory restraints
as documented in Table 2 and Table 3.27
III. Empirical Results and Interpretation
We now evaluate the effect of different firm and market characteristics on the direct
returns to each strategy. In doing so, we consider different specifications of the model
allowing for alternative combinations of complementarities and unobserved heterogene-
ity. We specify the vector of parameters .￿a; ￿h; ￿y ; ￿￿/ as linear functions of observable
variables.28
Table 4 presents the sample distribution of all regressors. However, not all of them
are included in the final specification of the model of Table 6. Ideally we would like
to include market indicators as regressors in the four observable returns .￿a; ￿h; ￿y ; ￿￿/.
However, this would leave us without sufficient observations given the large number of
dèpartements and the many parameters of our nonlinear model. Our preferred model
therefore includes the following regressors:
1) LIB is a dummy variable identifying all observations from the years 2003 and 2004,
i.e., after the European automobile distribution system was liberalized. This variable
27Proving identification in general in nonlinear models like the present one is a difficult task. Closely related to
ours, Bryan W. Brown (1983) makes use of the concept of observational equivalence to discuss the identification of a
model that is nonlinear in parameters only. Roger Bowden (1973) focuses on the identification of the distribution of the
random components by making use of Kullback’s information integral for any nonlinear model. Thomas J. Rothenberg
(1971) shows that an econometric model such as the one defined by the flexible profit function (1) together with the
unrestricted multivariate normal distribution of unobserved returns .￿a i ; ￿hi ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i / is identified as long as the
information matrix of the likelihood function is nonsingular. In the simplest case of Table 5, this implies confirming
that the determinant of an .18 ￿ 18/ matrix is non-zero at the estimated values of .￿a; ￿h; ￿y ; ￿￿ / for any possible
realization of .￿a i ; ￿hi ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i /. As this is impractical, we checked for the robustness of our estimates by using a
wide array of initial values. This is the standard procedure to check for identification and uniqueness in the estimation of
nonlinear models. Our estimates always converged to the same values.
28Miravete and Pernías (2006) need exclusion restrictions to estimate their model because they consider one demand-
enhancing and one cost reducing innovation. Thus, they need to isolate demand shifts independently from shifts in
marginal costs. Both APPS and HR software innovations embody features of demand enhancing and cost reducing inno-
vations. Therefore, at least in the framework of the present application, it makes little sense to define arbitrary exclusion
restrictions.
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TABLE 4—SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
All periods Pre-Expiry Post-Expiry
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
ln.GDPpc/ 3:195 0:320 3:171 0:325 3:240 0:305
ln.Density/ 5:541 1:693 5:530 1:705 5:563 1:673
ln.Population/ 13:596 0:674 13:583 0:672 13:622 0:679
Urban 0:106 0:309 0:093 0:291 0:132 0:340
Near 0:199 0:399 0:193 0:395 0:210 0:408
Paris 0:041 0:198 0:040 0:197 0:041 0:199
N 639 420 219
Means and standard deviations of exogenous variables by competition regime. The first
three variables are measured in logarithms. Gross domestic product per capita is mea-
sured in thousands of euros; population density in people per square kilometer; and popu-
lation in number of inhabitants of each market. The remaining variables are dummies. N
denotes the number of dealers in each sample.
is intended to capture the effects of this regime change and the associated increase
in competitive pressure on all endogenous variables of the model.
2) ln.GDPpc/ is the logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita in each dè-
partement measured in thousands of euros. We use this to account for differences
in the purchasing power of potential customers across markets that may relate to the
price elasticity of demand in each local market.
3) ln.Density/ is the logarithm of the population density of each market measured as
the number of inhabitants per square kilometer. Density may have several possible
effects. First, it is related to the cost of storage and display; in densely populated
markets rental space is more expensive. If this effect dominates, density should affect
scale negatively. Second, we can think of dense markets as being more competitive
since consumers can compare prices, products, and quality of services more easily
and thus switch from one dealer to another. Chad Syverson (2004) argues that the
pro-competitive effect of density is to foster efficiency (innovation adoption in our
case) and allow larger scales for a larger number of firms, since smaller and less
efficient ones do not survive in such demanding environments.
4) ln.Population/ is the logarithm of population in each dèpartement. Population ac-
counts for market size, which may play a significant role if dealers face important
fixed cost of entry.
5) Paris is a dummy variable to denote whether dealers are located in the Paris area,
which may face particularly different distribution costs, sophisticated consumers, or
access to know-how that affects the adoption of innovations.
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A. The Effect of Competitive Pressure on Adoption and Scale
Table 5 evaluates the effect of liberalization in the European automobile distribution
system ignoring the effect of other potential covariates. Table 6 presents the estimates
of four different vectors of .￿a; ￿h; ￿y ; ￿￿/ of the general model described in Section II.
We find that although the inclusion of market characteristics improves the estimation,
the effect of liberalization (LIB) retains its sign whenever it is significant and estimates
of complementarity effects, .ıah; ıay ; ıhy/ are robust to the inclusion of additional re-
gressors. The same holds for the correlation among the unobservable returns to each
strategy, in particular for the results of Model IV. Likelihood ratio tests similar to those
at the top of Table 7 always rejects the more restrictive model in favor of the more gen-
eral one, leaving Model IV as our preferred specification. That is, both unobservable
heterogeneity and complementarities matter in explaining simultaneous scale and prod-
uct and process innovation decisions. Consequently, we focus on the parameter estimates
of Model IV.29
We start by analyzing the effect of competitive pressure. The liberalization of the
European distribution system has significant direct effects on the returns to scale and HR
software innovation. The positive sign of the estimate of LIB on scale captures the effect
of increased competition after the removal of the exclusive territory restraint. As the
potential market expands, surviving dealerships increase the scale of their operations.
This result confirms the unconditional increase in scale after 2002 documented in the
third line of Table 1. In addition, our model allows for synergies among the returns of
different strategies. A larger scale of production increases the profitability of adopting
APPS software since these two strategies are complements, i.e., ıay > 0. Further, the two
types of software are substitutes as ıah < 0.
Competition increases the returns to adopting HR software independent of the scale
of dealerships. The effect of liberalization on APPS software adoption is also positive
but only indirectly, through an increase in the optimal scale of dealerships and the com-
plementary relationship between scale and APPS software. However, it is likely that the
overall effect of competition on the return to adopt APPS software is much larger and
negative as the synergy effect between APPS and HR software innovation is negative and
larger (in absolute value) than any other effect. Therefore, APPS and HR adoptions are
substitutes and dealers will specialize in adopting one of the two softwares as compet-
itive pressure increases, a result consistent with the specialization hypothesis of Cohen
and Klepper (1996). An interpretation consistent with this hypothesis is that perhaps
developing a dealer website (APPS) can be easily imitated. Thus, returns to the adoption
of APPS software are less appropriable than adopting HR software to make personnel
management more efficient; something that might be less portable to other dealerships.
Other regressors also have significant effects on the different strategies of the firms as
shown in Table 6. The returns to scale and other non-observable strategies are higher in
29Since some dealerships appear several times in our data while others appear only once and we pool all the data to
estimate our nonlinear model, we make use of cluster-robust standard errors to obtain the correct inference. They are not
only heteroskedastic-consistent, but also take into account the clustered nature of the data when repeated observations of
the same firm are present. See Jeffrey M. Wooldridge (2002, §13.8.2).
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TABLE 5—ESTIMATES: FRENCH AUTOMOBILE RETAILING (WITHOUT MARKET CONTROLS)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
￿a Constant ￿7:70 .2:94/￿￿￿ ￿6:20 .2:43/￿￿ ￿23:25 .10:20/￿￿ ￿51:30 .25:70/￿￿
LIB ￿1:38 .0:85/ ￿1:29 .0:72/￿ ￿3:71 .2:52/ ￿7:95 .5:71/
￿h Constant ￿4:44 .2:36/￿ ￿2:38 .0:48/￿￿￿ ￿29:01 .18:42/ ￿21:84 .7:05/￿￿￿
LIB 0:56 .0:64/ 0:24 .0:32/ 7:93 .6:28/ 4:98 .2:42/￿￿
￿y Constant ￿3:68 .1:68/￿￿ ￿3:76 .1:68/￿￿ ￿1:51 .0:90/￿ ￿2:37 .0:68/￿￿￿
LIB 3:97 .2:18/￿ 3:98 .2:19/￿ 1:62 .0:97/￿ 1:91 .0:47/￿￿￿
￿￿ Constant ￿1:89 .4:34/ ￿1:68 .4:50/ ￿4:86 .5:53/ ￿13:34 .3:36/￿￿￿
LIB 1:95 .2:00/ 1:98 .2:00/ ￿2:50 .3:60/ 1:25 .1:34/
￿ 13:40 .7:51/￿ 13:40 .7:52/￿ 5:48 .3:10/￿ 5:43 .1:25/￿￿￿
￿a 5:38 .1:82/
￿￿￿ 4:39 .1:49/￿￿￿ 16:21 .6:91/￿￿ 142:18 .20:05/￿￿￿
￿h 4:45 .2:37/
￿ 2:46 .0:42/￿￿￿ 127:42 .33:97/￿￿￿ 129:38 .8:42/￿￿￿
￿y 22:22 .12:64/
￿ 22:20 .12:65/￿ 9:09 .5:40/￿ 9:10 .2:33/￿￿￿
￿￿ 87:17 .26:41/
￿￿￿ 87:19 .26:40/￿￿￿ 98:22 .33:49/￿￿￿ 102:59 .8:46/￿￿￿





￿ah 0:13 .0:22/ 0:94 .0:02/
￿￿￿
￿ay 0:17 .0:19/ ￿0:48 .0:06/￿￿￿
￿hy ￿0:25 .0:12/￿￿ ￿0:29 .0:08/￿￿￿
￿a￿ ￿0:13 .0:22/ ￿0:99 .0:01/￿￿￿
￿h￿ ￿0:97 .0:03/￿￿￿ ￿0:97 .0:01/￿￿￿
￿y￿ 0:46 .0:11/
￿￿￿ 0:51 .0:06/￿￿￿
lnL ￿1022:9 ￿1015:8 ￿649:0 ￿590:4
Maximum likelihood estimates. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in between parentheses. Significance
levels are indicated with ￿ for p-values less than 0:1; ￿￿ for less than 0:05; and ￿￿￿ for less than 0:01. There is
a total of 639 observations.
larger and more affluent markets. Conversely, the returns to both software innovations are
higher in markets with lower income per capita and less population (APPS only). These
surprising negative effects are not necessarily the total effect of market size and income
on the returns to innovate since the model includes nonlinear interactions: ln.GDPpc/
and ln.Population/ also favors larger-scale dealerships which, in turn, favor the adoption
of APPS software, which in turn is a substitute of HR software. We will analyze the
interactions of these nonlinearities when discussing the results of the simulations of the
model later in Table 9.
An exogenous change in regulation, LIB, is not the only way to measure the effects
of increased competitive pressure. Competitiveness may also vary across markets due
to other factors. Syverson (2004) suggests using population density to control for these
market-specific differences in competitiveness. The idea is that more densely populated
areas require more firms to serve it, thus enabling consumers to switch suppliers, leading
to a higher degree of product substitution.30 We include this variable as a regressor
30According to Vives (2008, §1), this is a useful measure of competitive pressure both with and without entry. Notice
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TABLE 6—ESTIMATES: FRENCH AUTOMOBILE RETAILING
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
￿a Constant ￿3:33 .0:80/￿￿￿ ￿3:05 .0:91/￿￿￿ ￿6:55 .77:55/ ￿55:96 .12:69/￿￿￿
LIB ￿0:66 .0:40/￿ ￿0:67 .0:39/￿ ￿1:33 .15:57/ ￿0:72 .5:37/
ln.GDPpc/ 1:90 .1:46/ 1:61 .1:42/ 4:18 .49:25/ ￿57:06 .22:48/￿￿
ln.Density/ ￿0:10 .0:23/ ￿0:02 .0:23/ ￿0:17 .2:59/ 11:49 .3:85/￿￿￿
ln.Population/ ￿0:46 .0:71/ ￿0:61 .0:71/ ￿1:12 .13:54/ ￿27:29 .7:66/￿￿￿
Paris 0:05 .1:77/ ￿0:19 .1:57/ ￿0:79 .10:69/ 77:74 .41:23/￿
￿h Constant ￿2:48 .0:55/￿￿￿ ￿1:43 .0:20/￿￿￿ ￿37:75 .41:13/ ￿26:11 .3:82/￿￿￿
LIB 0:37 .0:32/ 0:20 .0:18/ 16:23 .16:16/ 9:57 .3:21/￿￿￿
ln.GDPpc/ ￿1:15 .1:27/ ￿0:87 .0:77/ ￿135:39 .186:67/ ￿77:08 .14:43/￿￿￿
ln.Density/ ￿0:18 .0:25/ ￿0:08 .0:15/ 13:05 .41:70/ 8:23 .1:94/￿￿￿
ln.Population/ 0:99 .0:47/￿￿ 0:54 .0:30/￿ ￿5:59 .71:77/ ￿2:41 .3:30/
Paris 0:97 .1:39/ 0:62 .0:83/ 106:36 .286:22/ 67:35 .32:51/￿￿
￿y Constant ￿3:33 .1:57/￿￿ ￿3:37 .1:57/￿￿ ￿1:42 .2:03/ ￿2:19 .0:54/￿￿￿
LIB 2:75 .1:64/￿ 2:76 .1:64/￿ 1:20 .0:78/ 1:53 .0:50/￿￿￿
ln.GDPpc/ 15:95 .13:50/ 15:91 .13:49/ 7:00 .7:23/ 5:46 .2:98/￿
ln.Density/ ￿3:58 .3:21/ ￿3:57 .3:20/ ￿1:55 .1:53/ ￿1:46 .0:73/￿￿
ln.Population/ 6:92 .5:73/ 6:90 .5:73/ 3:01 .2:68/ 3:16 .1:17/￿￿￿
Paris 1:15 .10:42/ 1:14 .10:38/ 0:53 .12:83/ 0:47 .3:26/
￿￿ Constant 1:98 .4:10/ 2:09 .4:12/ ￿1:80 .41:49/ ￿9:84 .1:56/￿￿￿
LIB ￿3:57 .3:75/ ￿3:56 .3:76/ ￿6:29 .13:66/ ￿2:98 .2:47/
ln.GDPpc/ 76:58 .47:28/ 76:65 .47:36/ 61:71 .184:22/ 66:47 .7:51/￿￿￿
ln.Density/ ￿13:44 .9:60/ ￿13:48 .9:61/ ￿6:82 .40:02/ ￿8:69 .1:06/￿￿￿
ln.Population/ 19:99 .11:83/￿ 20:08 .11:82/￿ 2:42 .62:55/ 8:72 .1:50/￿￿￿
Paris ￿45:39 .31:33/ ￿45:22 .31:40/ ￿45:55 .253:19/ ￿51:34 .18:21/￿￿￿
￿ 13:49 .7:37/￿ 13:48 .7:36/￿ 5:98 .2:04/￿￿￿ 5:65 .0:87/￿￿￿
￿a 2:29 .0:51/
￿￿￿ 2:13 .0:62/￿￿￿ 4:56 .54:11/ 143:03 .10:77/￿￿￿
￿h 2:38 .0:55/
￿￿￿ 1:40 .0:18/￿￿￿ 128:29 .9:95/￿￿￿ 126:94 .4:98/￿￿￿
￿y 21:96 .12:14/
￿ 21:93 .12:13/￿ 9:75 .3:20/￿￿￿ 9:29 .1:48/￿￿￿
￿￿ 85:87 .25:53/
￿￿￿ 85:87 .25:52/￿￿￿ 97:71 .5:85/￿￿￿ 101:69 .4:20/￿￿￿





￿ah 0:10 .0:75/ 0:95 .0:01/
￿￿￿
￿ay 0:23 .0:34/ ￿0:46 .0:06/￿￿￿
￿hy ￿0:23 .0:11/￿￿ ￿0:27 .0:08/￿￿￿
￿a￿ ￿0:03 .0:79/ ￿0:99 .0:00/￿￿￿
￿h￿ ￿0:96 .0:02/￿￿￿ ￿0:96 .0:01/￿￿￿
￿y￿ 0:48 .0:11/
￿￿￿ 0:51 .0:06/￿￿￿
lnL ￿991:8 ￿985:3 ￿615:1 ￿567:5
Maximum likelihood estimates. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in between parentheses. Significance
levels are indicated with ￿ for p-values less than 0:1; ￿￿ for less than 0:05; and ￿￿￿ for less than 0:01. There is a
total of 639 observations.
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in our estimation. Population density identifies competitive pressure through variations
across markets and time. Indeed it has a positive effect on the returns to adopting both
types of software but a negative effect on scale. Contrary to Syverson (2004) more dense
markets feature smaller dealers. This suggests that the effect of costly storage dominates
in an industry for which space scarcity in dense cities becomes critical.31 The lack of
significance of the Paris dummy on scale supports this alternative interpretation. The
Parisian market also behaves differently with respect to all innovation strategies, with
very large returns for both APPS and HR software adoptions.
The unobserved returns associated to different strategies are significantly correlated
with each other, therefore emphasizing the need to control for the existence of unob-
servable heterogeneity when estimating the determinants of potentially complementary
firm strategies. Comparing Models II and IV, we can assess the effects of ignoring un-
observed heterogeneity. The estimates of Model II ignore unobserved returns and offer
a starkly different interpretation of the effect of liberalization. Following Model II, we
would wrongly conclude that there are very small complementarities between scale and
innovations and no complementarity at all between software decisions. Moreover, the
increase in competitive pressure will not affect the scale of production or innovation
activities. These results would be at odds with the unconditional correlations among
strategies reported in Table 3.
We now evaluate the estimation bias of ignoring complementarities by comparing
Model III and IV. The estimates of .￿ah; ￿ay ; ￿hy/ in Model III are commonly used to
evaluate complementarities following Arora and Gambardella (1990). It involves mea-
suring the correlation of residuals after regressing the adoption of strategies on observ-
able firm and market characteristics only. The estimates of Model III depict a situation
where APPS software adoption would (wrongly) be independent of any other strategy
and small firms would have an advantage in adopting HR software. The estimates of
.ıah; ıay ; ıhy/ in Model IV tell quite a different story, as discussed above. Further, ignor-
ing complementarities also affects the significance of many other estimates. In particular,
liberalization has no significant effect on any choice variable.
B. Robustness of Estimates
The estimates reported in Table 6 use most but not all information available to us. We
experimented with different combinations of regressors to obtain the best fit of the model.
Table 7 presents a collection of specification tests to provide support for our preferred
specification. Indeed, all tests favor the specification of Model IV in Table 6 over any
considered alternative.
The top section of Table 7 presents a set of likelihood ratio tests comparing the dif-
ferent specifications of the profit function under the null hypothesis that the first model
(of each comparison) is the correct one. All paired tests favor the comparatively more
however that, given the nature of car distribution, population density may have a countervailing effect on competition due
to the increasing costs of storage in urban areas.
31This intuition has been supported by interviews with industry experts who emphasized the space constraints car
dealers face and the high proportion of real estate expenditures in overall expenditures.
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TABLE 7—SOME SPECIFICATION TESTS
￿2 d.f. p-value
LR tests for model comparisons
Model I vs. Model IV 848:58 9 0:000
Model II vs. Model IV 835:71 6 0:000
Model III vs. Model IV 95:28 3 0:000
Model I vs. Model III 753:30 6 0:000
Model I vs. Model II 12:87 3 0:005
Wald test for joint significance
All covariates 1039:60 20 0:000
LIB 18:62 4 0:001
ln.GDPpc/ 86:78 4 0:000
ln.Density/ 100:55 4 0:000
ln.Population/ 43:76 4 0:000
Paris 11:90 4 0:018
LR tests for additional regressors
Y2001 0:87 4 0:929
Y2002 3:01 4 0:555
Y2001, Y2002 6:25 8 0:619
Urban 2:39 4 0:664
Near 1:08 4 0:898
Urban, Near 3:31 8 0:913
All 9:72 16 0:881
These test statistics are distributed, under the respective null hypothe-
sis, as ￿2 with degrees of freedom as indicated in the ‘d.f.’ column.
general over the more restrictive specification. Hence, Model IV, which allows for com-
plementarities among strategies as well as correlated unobserved returns to each strategy,
is our preferred specification.
The middle section of Table 7 evaluates whether the included regressors in our pre-
ferred specification are at all informative using a Wald test where the null hypothesis is
that these regressors are not jointly significant. For instance, we test whether ln.GDPpc/
can be excluded simultaneously in the specification of ￿a, ￿h, ￿y , and ￿￿ . The answer in
all cases is negative.
The bottom section of Table 7 confirms that the remaining variables available to us
do not improve the estimation. The logic for their potential inclusion (although the de-
scribed effects are not significant) is the following. First,Urban indicates whether a large
city (over 300;000 people) is located within the dèpartement defining the market. Cities
may attract more sophisticated customers and skilled professionals. Thus, because of
agglomeration effects, it may be easier in these areas to find the expertise to adopt inno-
vations that improve service or allow firms to provide services more efficiently. Second,
Near designates the dèpartements surrounding the dèpartement where a large city is lo-
cated. This regressor is used to test whether this administrative division corresponds to
a well defined market for the purposes of our study. Lastly, variables Y2001 and Y2002
are of particular interest. They are dummies that identify observations from the years
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2001 and 2002, just ahead of the liberalization of the European automobile distribution
system. As discussed in Section I.A, the active regulation of this industry was known
to expire in September of 2002. Thus, our definition of LIB might not capture the full
effect of liberalization because dealers anticipated it. It is however well documented that
while the overhaul of the old regulatory regime was known, the defining features of the
new one were not decided until shortly before it was put into place. Estimates of Y2001
and Y2002 are not significant, either jointly or individually in any return equation, which
strongly supports our claim that LIB was not anticipated and identifies an exogenous
regime change.
C. Quantifying the Effect of Liberalization
The estimates of Table 7 only indicate the direct effect of each regressor on the corre-
sponding returns to each strategy. From this, we can conclude that, for example, a change
in scale triggered by a 1 percent increase of GDP per capita is equivalent to the change
due to a 4 percent reduction in population density. Similarly, the positive effect of LIB
on the returns to the scale of production is roughly equivalent to a 60 percent increase of
the market population. That is, firms in a liberalized market will choose an average scale
equivalent to a firm in a 60 percent more populous market pre-liberalization.
These numbers do not necessarily tell the entire story because they do not account for
the interdependencies of strategies in the profit function. What is the overall effect of
liberalizing the European automobile distribution system on the endogenous variables
of our model? In the end, changes in scale of production and/or innovation profiles
of firms respond to a combination of direct effects of liberalization and the synergies
of interdependent strategies. The answer to this question is complex because of the
nonlinear nature of our model, the interactions among parameters, and the existence of
correlated unobserved returns.
To evaluate the impact of the increase in competitive pressure therefore, we use our
sample of firms to carry out a simulation exercise based on the estimates of Model IV
from Table 6. Using the values of the estimated distributional parameters —.￿ah, ￿ay ,
￿a￿ , ￿hy , ￿h￿ , ￿y￿/ and .￿a, ￿h, ￿y , ￿￿/— of Model IV we generate 2;000 random
draws of the remaining parameters of the model from their sampling distribution (given
by the estimated coefficients and the covariance matrix of estimates). For each of these
draws we generate 150 draws of unobserved returns .￿a i , ￿h i , ￿y i , ￿￿ i /, which are
jointly distributed according to a multivariate normal distribution with an expected value
of 0 and a covariance matrix given by our estimates of the correlation coefficients .￿ah,
￿ay , ￿a￿ , ￿hy , ￿h￿ , ￿y￿/ and standard deviations .￿a, ￿h, ￿y , ￿￿/ in Model IV of Ta-
ble 6. We then compute the predicted choices of scale, adoption of product and process
innovations, and profit realizations .xa i , xh i , xy i , ￿i / for every firm before the liber-
alization, i.e., when LIB D 0, for each of the 300;000 scenarios. We then repeat the
analysis adding the estimated value of LIB to the return to each strategy and recompute
all optimal choices after the liberalization, i.e., when LIB D 1. The difference indicates
the overall effect that liberalization has on each element of interest of the model.
Table 8 presents the overall effect of liberalization on the endogenous variables. In
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TABLE 8—SIMULATION OF THE LIBERALIZATION EFFECT: DISTRIBUTION PERCENTILES
Percentiles
Mean 5th 25th Median 75th 95th Pr.< 0/
Total Effects
xy (percent) 23:09 8:60 17:54 23:33 28:78 37:01 0:65
xa ￿2:00 ￿5:38 ￿3:38 ￿1:95 ￿0:73 1:56 83:65
xh 4:89 1:65 3:71 4:85 6:14 7:92 0:55
￿(1000C) 0:34 ￿2:12 ￿0:75 0:34 1:36 2:87 41:10
None ￿2:46 ￿3:86 ￿3:05 ￿2:46 ￿1:88 ￿1:02 99:80
Only APPS ￿2:43 ￿5:53 ￿3:66 ￿2:41 ￿1:30 0:72 91:25
Only HR 4:46 1:00 3:16 4:43 5:80 7:80 2:10
Both 0:43 ￿0:16 0:20 0:43 0:67 1:03 11:45
Direct Effects
xy (percent) 26:60 13:47 21:04 26:69 31:84 40:42 0:15
xa ￿0:13 ￿2:38 ￿1:08 ￿0:11 0:75 2:11 53:25
xh 2:99 1:47 2:37 2:99 3:62 4:50 0:00
￿(1000C) 0:67 ￿2:62 ￿0:68 0:66 2:02 3:93 36:25
None ￿2:27 ￿3:65 ￿2:85 ￿2:29 ￿1:70 ￿0:82 99:60
Only APPS ￿0:72 ￿1:34 ￿0:93 ￿0:70 ￿0:50 ￿0:17 97:80
Only HR 2:40 0:57 1:65 2:38 3:11 4:29 1:15
Both 0:59 ￿1:48 ￿0:22 0:65 1:41 2:50 31:25
Complementarities Effects
xy (percent) ￿3:51 ￿9:89 ￿5:68 ￿3:40 ￿1:32 2:60 84:70
xa ￿1:88 ￿3:82 ￿2:51 ￿1:78 ￿1:19 ￿0:13 96:15
xh 1:90 ￿0:79 0:92 1:85 2:94 4:52 10:95
￿(1000C) ￿0:34 ￿2:34 ￿1:18 ￿0:38 0:49 1:79 61:55
None ￿0:19 ￿0:35 ￿0:25 ￿0:19 ￿0:13 ￿0:04 98:35
Only APPS ￿1:71 ￿4:36 ￿2:73 ￿1:65 ￿0:73 0:95 87:10
Only HR 2:07 0:28 1:35 1:99 2:71 4:04 2:85
Both ￿0:16 ￿1:58 ￿0:79 ￿0:20 0:46 1:36 58:40
Empirical distribution of the direct, indirect, and total effects of 300;000 simulations. They measure the
percent change in the scale before and after the liberalization. Profits are measured in thousand of euros. All
other variables are changes in probabilities (￿100). The rightmost column shows the empirical probability
(￿100) that the corresponding effect is negative.
addition to averaging over the 300;000 simulations, Table 8 documents their empirical
distribution by reporting the percentiles of the effect of liberalization on each variable.
The range defined by the 5 percent and 95 percent percentiles is the 90 percent confidence
interval of the empirical distribution of the effect of liberalization.
Table 8 decomposes the total effects of liberalization into those derived under the as-
sumption of independent strategies and those due to complementarity. The total effects
are the result of evaluating exactly Model IV of Table 6. The effects under independence
ignore any synergy due to complementarity; i.e., we evaluate Model IV of Table 6 but
restrict ıah D ıay D ıhy D 0. The complementarity effects are simply computed as
the difference between the other two. Consider the case of profits as an example. The
mean increase in profits after the liberalization amounts to 335C. The mean direct ef-
fect of liberalization reaches 673C but mean profit synergies due to complementarities
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TABLE 9—SIMULATION: OTHER EXOGENOUS COVARIATES
ln.GDPpc/ ln.Density/ ln.Population/ Paris
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
xy (percent) 10:30 5:47 ￿2:36 1:50 3:97 2:26 43:22 68:39
xa 0:32 1:02 0:14 0:24 ￿0:87 0:44 17:77 15:32
xh ￿2:93 0:98 0:19 0:27 0:53 0:41 13:23 12:14
￿(1000C) 3:18 0:87 ￿0:38 0:32 0:35 0:37 0:09 15:07
None 2:11 0:50 ￿0:25 0:24 0:22 0:25 ￿21:17 9:45
Only APPS 0:83 0:93 0:07 0:22 ￿0:75 0:40 7:94 11:51
Only HR ￿2:42 1:00 0:11 0:27 0:65 0:42 3:39 11:54
Both ￿0:51 0:21 0:08 0:11 ￿0:12 0:12 9:83 6:60
Mean and standard deviation of after changing the continuous exogenous variables by 10 percent as well as the
Paris dummy.
amount to ￿338C. There is substantial heterogeneity in profits across firms regarding
the liberalization of the European automobile distribution system. While the bottom 5
percent dealer loses about 2;000C the top 95 percent increases profits by almost 3;000C.
Despite this heterogeneity of effects across firms, the increase in scale, the probability of
adopting HR software, the probability of only adopting HR software, and the probability
of not adopting any software at all show unambiguous signs. These first three effects
are consistently positive (only negative with probability 0:0065, 0:0055, and 0:0210, re-
spectively) while almost every firm (excluding only 0:20 percent of them) is more likely
to adopt some software after the liberalization of the European automobile distribution
system. This strongly suggests that liberalization really did have a tangible effect on firm
behavior.
Removal of the exclusive territory restraint has a positive direct effect on scale (about
27 percent) and on the probability of adopting the HR software (about 3 percent). HR and
APPS are strong substitutes, thus triggering a reduction in the probability of adoption of
APPS software of almost 2 percent. This in turn reduces the effect of adoption of LIB on
scale by 4 percent as scale and APPS are complements. Overall, LIB increases the scale
by 23 percent and the probability of adoption of HR software by 5 percent.
Finally, Table 9 reports the mean and standard deviation of the total effects of changes
of all other exogenous variables. Income per capita has an overall significant positive
effect on the scale and profits while reducing the probability of adopting HR software.
More competition as measured by population density only has a marginal negative total
effect on scale. The size of the market as measured by its population positively affects the
scale of production and reduces the probability of adopting APPS software. The effects
of being situated in Paris are large but also very dispersed. The only one that appears to
be significant is the reduction in the probability of not adopting any software.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the French automobile market between 2000 and 2004 and
in particular, the adoption of two software technologies by car dealers following the de
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facto removal of the exclusive territory restraint following the change in regulation of the
European automobile distribution system in September 2002. Our econometric model
integrates for the first time the adoption and productivity approaches long discussed in
the innovation and management literature for the past two decades and makes use of a
number of unique features of our data to identify an increase in competition within the
setting of a well-defined single industry.
First, our paper makes use of an exogenous regime shift to identify the effect of in-
creasing competitive pressure on the decision to adopt potentially interdependent inno-
vations. Moreover, we estimate an equilibrium model in which firms choose not only
whether to adopt innovations but also their scale of production, which is often treated
as exogenous in most empirical studies of innovation activity. The estimation relies on
a flexible specification of the profit function and the associated optimality conditions
that characterize the optimal scale and innovation profile of each firm. Our equilibrium
approach lets us recover the structural parameters of the model from the observed pro-
duction and innovation decisions of firms, including those pertaining to the payoff syner-
gies associated to the simultaneous use of different strategies. Adding profit information
helps us control for the effect of other strategies that firms may use but are unknown to
us. We also assume that returns may incorporate an unobserved firm-specific compo-
nent. By assuming these to be distributed as unrestricted multivariate normal variables,
we are able not only to obtain maximum likelihood estimates robust to unobserved het-
erogeneity, but also to estimate for the first time the “Random Practice Model” proposed
by Athey and Stern (1998) to study complementarities.
Our results indicate that an increase in competitive pressure leads to an expansion in
the scale of dealerships and increases the returns to adopting HR software (independently
of the size of the dealership). We also find that complementarities exist and are robust
to firms’ unobserved heterogeneity associated to the returns to each strategy. Scale and
APPS software are complements while APPS and HR softwares are substitutes. The com-
bination of these results suggests that dealers will specialize in one of the two technolo-
gies available to them once the environment they operate in becomes more competitive.
This result is reminiscent of the argument put forward by Cohen and Klepper (1996) and
suggests that HR software may have better appropriability features than APPS software.
Another interesting result we obtain is that the increased competition that characterizes
more densely populated markets —e.g., Syverson (2004)— favors the adoption of both
software types, while population density has a negative effect on the scale of dealerships
as storage costs are quite important in the car dealership industry,
The flexible econometric approach we develop in this paper allows us to identify the
different channels through which competition affects the adoption of new technologies.
Specifically, we document the existence of complementarities and the fact that the larger
optimal scale following an increase in competitive pressure triggers an increase in the
rate of adoption of HR software, which in turn reduces the profitability of APPS software.
Similar results, if confirmed in other settings, are of interest to policymakers who will
have to form ex-ante priors about the social welfare implications of specific types of inno-
vations, as a policy shift may affect innovation adoption in different ways depending on
the magnitude of payoff synergies among different strategies. More generally, the notion
28 KRETSCHMER, MIRAVETE, AND PERNÍAS
that the adoption of different innovations is likely to be a joint decision with scale and
that adoption decisions may substitute for each other implies that future research should
take into account these complementarities to adequately study the innovation adoption
behavior of firms.
V. Appendix: Data Sources
The dataset we use is built from a large firm-level database on the usage of Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT). Specifically, the data contain annual informa-
tion on the software used in about 4;000 companies in a wide variety of industries. We
merge the software data with other data sets including firm specific accounting informa-
tion, as well as socioeconomic and demographic data from publicly available sources:
1) ICT data is collected by Harte-Hanks (HH), a worldwide direct marketing company
providing information on computer, software and IT staff usage to clients such as
IBM and Oracle for their direct marketing purposes. The data is collected by Euro-
pean and US based call centers. Data include numbers of PCs, servers, and main-
frames, the size of the IT department and its functions, as well as brand, version,
and use of specific software. The data is provided annually per site (i.e., for each
address). In our empirical setting, most of the firms have only one site so we treat
sites and firms as equivalent. Further, we believe that this is justified since decisions
about the introduction of specific software programs (as specified below) is likely to
take place at the site rather than the corporate level.
2) The data set AMADEUS contains the financial accounts of a large number of com-
panies registered in France. One of the key advantages of using AMADEUS is that
it contains data on listed as well as unlisted companies. This is particularly useful
because it also allows us to study the adoption behavior of small and medium sized
firms and not only large ones. Reporting regulations in France ensure that we have
access to a large amount of financial information, including turnover, employees,
tangible assets, costs, and profits.
3) French socioeconomic and demographic data is available from the French Statistical
Office (INSEE). We collect dèpartement level data on gross domestic product (GDP)
and the Population to proxy for market size. We also collected the surface area of
these dèpartements to obtain a measure of population density for these markets and
identified dèpartements containing large cities (Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse, and
Nice all exceed 300;000 inhabitants), to define markets with an important Urban
influence.
Harte-Hanks surveys firms based on a repeated process of comparing the firms already
in the sample with the overall population of firms available from public sources. Firms
with over 100 employees as well as subsidiaries of large firms (such as company-owned
car dealerships) are then targeted for inclusion in the sample. For larger firms, Harte-
Hanks therefore target a census of active firms with more than 100 employees, with
smaller firms remaining in the sample if they have shrunk but once had more than 100
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employees or if they are a subsidiary of a larger firm. If a targeted firm answers a suffi-
cient number of questions on their IT use (usually above 60–80 percent), it is included
in the database. There is no indication that the firms refusing to answer outright or not
answering enough questions are significantly different from the ones that do, suggesting
that inclusion in the sample given the firm was in the sampling frame is random. The
sampling process described above is consistent across different years, so that our sample
consists of a similar selection of larger-than-average firms each year.32
Our sample includes either larger dealers or the headquarters of dealership chains.
While the number of employees in a single dealership rarely exceeds 100, the average
number of employees in a dealership chain among the top 50 dealer groups in 2003 was
750.33 Software is typically adopted in a coordinated fashion across different sites in
a chain, suggesting that we are using the appropriate unit of analysis for studying the
adoption of interdependent software. These larger firms are among those who survive
the restructuring of the industry post-regulation and thus the include those business units
for which the adoption of innovations is a relevant decision variable. Smaller dealers
only contemplated leaving the industry, and so they had most likely not been innovating
before 2002.34
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MATHEMATICAL WEB APPENDIX: LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
Profit function (1) includes includes four differentiated structural error components
.￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i /, whose realizations uniquely determine the observed optimal choice
of .xa i ; xh i ; xy i ;￿i /. To estimate the model we assume that the vector of unobservable
returns follows an unrestricted multivariate normal distribution.
The Joint Density of Scale and Profits.—To write the likelihood function we first con-
dition on the two continuous variables of the model, i.e., scale and profits. First, from
equation (3), the unobserved return associated to scale is
(A1) ￿y i D ￿xy i ￿ ￿y ￿ ıayxa i ￿ ıhyxh i ;
and next we rewrite the profit equation (1) as follows
(A2) ￿p i D ￿i ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿axa i ￿ ￿hxh i ￿ ıahxa ixh i C .￿=2/x2y i ;
where we define ￿p i as the total unobserved return to adopting any strategy other than
the scale, that is
(A3) ￿p i D ￿￿ i C ￿a ixa i C ￿h ixh i :
Because of our normality assumptions on the distribution of ￿i , it follows that ￿p i is also
normally distributed with zero mean and variance
(A4) ￿2p i D ￿2￿ C .￿2a C2￿a￿￿￿a￿/xa i C .￿2h C2￿h￿￿￿h￿/xh i C2￿a￿h￿ahxa ixh i :
Thus, the joint density of ￿y i and ￿p i is given by
(A5) g.￿y i ; ￿p i / D .￿y￿p i /￿1￿2.￿y i=￿y ; ￿p i=￿p i I ￿yp i /;
where the correlation coefficient between ￿y i and ￿p i is
(A6) ￿yp i D .￿￿￿y￿ C ￿a￿ayxa i C ￿h￿hyxh i /=￿p i :
Notice that given the distribution of ￿i , and making use of (A3), equations (1) and (3)
define a transformation from .￿y i ; ￿p i / to .xy i ;￿i /. The determinant of the Jacobian of
the inverse transformation given by equations (A1) and (A2) is
(A7) J D
ˇˇˇˇ






ˇˇˇˇ D ˇˇˇˇ ￿ 0￿￿xy i 1
ˇˇˇˇ
D ￿ > 0:
The determinant of the Jacobian of the inverse transformation is strictly positive be-
cause of the assumption that profits are concave in xy i . Thus, equations (1) and (3)
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define a one-to-one transformation from .￿y i ; ￿p i / to .xy i ;￿i / so that the joint density
of .xy i ;￿i / is
(A8) g.xy i ;￿i / D .￿y￿p i /￿1￿2.￿y i=￿y ; ￿p i=￿p i I ￿yp i /￿;
which depends on the values of xa i and xh i through equations (A1) and (A2).
Probability of Innovation Profile Choice.—The adoption of innovations is determined
by conditions (13a)–(13c), which also depends on the unobserved returns to scale and
innovations. Therefore, we first rewrite those equations conditioning on ￿y i and ￿p i ,
and second, we derive the probabilities of observing each of the four possible innovation
profiles. Thus, we write
￿a i D ma i C ￿a:yp i ;(A9a)
￿h i D mh i C ￿h:yp i ;(A9b)
where ma i and mh i , are the expectations of ￿a i and ￿h i , conditional on ￿y i and ￿p i
respectively, i.e.,
ma i D ￿a .￿ay ￿ ￿ap i￿yp i /￿y i=￿y C .￿ap i ￿ ￿ay￿yp i /￿p i=￿p i
1 ￿ ￿2yp i
;(A10a)
mh i D ￿h
.￿hy ￿ ￿hp i￿yp i /￿y i=￿y C .￿hp i ￿ ￿hy￿yp i /￿p i=￿p i
1 ￿ ￿2yp i
;(A10b)
and where the correlations between ￿p i and ￿a i ; ￿h i are
￿ap i D .￿￿￿a￿ C ￿axa i C ￿h￿ahxh i /=￿p i ;(A11a)
￿hp i D .￿￿￿h￿ C ￿hxh i C ￿a￿ahxh i /=￿p i ;(A11b)
so that ￿a:yp i , ￿h:yp i are normal variables that, by construction, are independent of ￿y i
and ￿p i . They have variances




ay C ￿2ap i ￿ 2￿yp i￿ay￿ap i
1 ￿ ￿2yp i
!
;(A12a)







￿ 2￿yp i￿hy￿hp i
1 ￿ ￿2yp i
!
;(A12b)
and covariance given by




￿ay￿hy C ￿ap i￿hp i ￿ ￿yp i .￿ay￿hp i C ￿ap i￿hy/
1 ￿ ￿2yp i
!
:
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Next, we substitute the unobserved returns to innovations given by equations (A9a)
and (A9b) into conditions (13a)–(13c) and after rearranging terms we get
qa i￿a:yp i > ￿ qa i .ka i C ıxh i /;(A14a)
qh i￿h:yp i > ￿ qh i .kh i C ıxa i /;(A14b)
qh i￿s:yp i > ￿ qh i
￿




ka i D ￿a i Cma i ;(A15a)
kh i D ￿h i Cmh i ;(A15b)
￿s:yp i D ￿h:yp i C si￿a:yp i ;(A15c)
which is a normal variable with zero mean and variance equal to
(A16) ￿2s:yp i D ￿2a:yp i C ￿2h:yp i C 2si￿a:yp i￿h:yp i￿ah:yp i :
Furthermore, the correlation coefficients among ￿s:yp i and ￿a:yp i ; ￿h:yp i are
￿as:yp i D .￿h:yp i￿ah:yp i C si￿a:yp i /=￿s:yp i ;(A17a)
￿hs:yp i D .￿h:yp i C si￿a:yp i￿ah:yp i /=￿s:yp i :(A17b)
Consider now the probability that firm i adopts both innovations, i.e., xa i D 1, and
xh i D 1. Then, conditional on ￿y i and ￿p i , conditions (8a)–(8c) must hold; that is
￿a:yp i > ￿ ka i ￿ ı;(A18a)
￿h:yp i > ￿ kh i ￿ ı;(A18b)
￿s:yp i > ￿ ka i ￿ kh i ￿ ı:(A18c)
There are two cases of interest depending on the value of ı:
1) ı ￿ 0. In this case the last of the above inequalities does not bind. This case
corresponds to the bottom of Figure 1 where ￿i .1; 1/ is rectangular and thus, the
probability of adopting both innovations becomes
(A19) Pr.xa i D 1; xh i D 1/ D Pr.￿a:yp i > ￿ka i ￿ ı; ￿h:yp i > ￿kh i ￿ ı/;
which, given our assumption of joint normal distribution, leads to
(A20) Pr.xa i D 1; xh i D 1/ D ˆ2
￿
ka i C ı
￿a:yp i
;





ˆ2.￿I ￿/ is the cumulative density function of a standard bivariate normal distribution
with correlation coefficient ￿, which in this case is the correlation coefficient between
￿a:yp i and ￿h:yp i (or, equivalently, the correlation between ￿a i and ￿h i conditional
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on ￿y i ; ￿p i ):
(A21) ￿ah:yp i D cov.￿a:yp i ; ￿h:yp i /=.￿a:yp i￿h:yp i /:
2) ı > 0. Now the three inequalities (A18a)–(A18c) bind. This case corresponds to
the top of Figure 1 where ￿i .1; 1/ is no longer rectangular. To compute the proba-
bility of adopting both innovations, we split the region defined by the three inequal-
ities (A18a)–(A18c) into the following two disjoint areas defined by
￿a:yp i > ￿ ka i ;(A22a)
￿h:yp i > ￿ kh i ￿ ı;(A22b)
and by
￿ka i > ￿a:yp i > ￿ka i ￿ ı;(A23a)
￿s:yp i > ￿ ka i ￿ kh i ￿ ı;(A23b)
where the second set of inequalities make use of a change of basis so that the in-
tegration region defined in the .￿a:yp i ; ￿s:yp i / plane is rectangular. Integrating the
probability density function of .￿a:yp i ; ￿h:yp i / over the area defined by (A22a) and
(A22b) we get











and integrating the probability density function of .￿a:yp i ; ￿s:yp i / over the region
defined by (A23a)–(A23b) we have
(A25) Pr.￿ka i > ￿a:yp i > ￿ka i ￿ ı; ￿s:yp i > ￿ka i ￿ kh i ￿ ı/ D
ˆ2
￿
ka i C ı
￿a:yp i
;















Finally, combining (A24), and (A25) we obtain the probability that a firm engages
in both product and process innovation as












ka i C ı
￿a:yp i
;
















We can determine the probabilities of adopting each innovative profile in a similar
manner. To provide a general notation, let’s define the indicator variable Ii as
(A27) Ii D
(
1 if siı > 0;
0 if siı ￿ 0:
Then, since xa i and xh i may take only values in f0; 1g, we have




ka i C ıŒIi ￿ xh i .2Ii ￿ 1/￿
￿a:yp i
; qh i








ka i C ı
￿a:yp i
; qh i
kh i C ı=2C si .ka i C ı=2/
￿s:yp i







kh i C ı=2C si .2ka i C ı=2/
￿s:yp i
I qh i￿as:yp i
￿￿
:
The Likelihood Function.—Finally, we write the unconditional probability of observ-
ing a firm with specific strategy choices by multiplying the conditional probability of a
given innovation profile (A28), by the join density of the distribution of scale and profits
from other activities (A8), to obtain the contribution of observation i to the logarithm of
the likelihood function
(A29) lnLi .‚jxy i ;￿i ; xa i ; xh i / D






ka i C ıŒIi ￿ xh i .2Ii ￿ 1/￿
￿a:yp i
; qh i







ka i C ı
￿a:yp i
; qh i
kh i C ı=2C si .ka i C ı=2/
￿s:yp i








kh i C ı=2C si .2ka i C ı=2/
￿s:yp i
I qh i￿as:yp i
￿￿
;
where ‚ D .￿a, ￿h, ￿y , ￿￿ , ıah, ıay , ıhy , ￿ , ￿a, ￿h, ￿y , ￿￿ , ￿ah, ￿ay , ￿a￿ , ￿hy , ￿h￿ ,
￿y￿/
0 is the vector of parameters of the model.
Normalization.—Directly maximizing the log-likelihood function (A29) with respect
to the elements of parameter vector ‚ is complicated by the non-negativity of some
parameters (as is the case of ￿ and the standard deviations ￿a, ￿h, ￿y , and ￿￿ ) and by the
restrictions on the correlation coefficients (￿ah, ￿ay , . . . , ￿y￿ ) imposed by the positive
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definiteness of correlation matrix R given in equation (15). We thus reparameterize the
likelihood function in order to avoid these restrictions. First, we define the parameter '
as
(A30) ' D ln.￿/;
so that ' is unrestricted although ￿ is restricted to be positive. Second, we can write the
covariance matrix of unobservables .￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i /0 as
(A31) † D DRD;
whereD is a diagonal matrix whose main diagonal entries are .￿a; ￿h; ￿y ; ￿￿/ and R is
the correlation matrix given in equation (15). Consider now the Cholesky decomposition
of †,
(A32) † D LL0;
where L is a lower triangular matrix with strictly positive diagonal entries. From lij , the
non-zero entries of matrix L, we define
(A33) ￿ij D
(
lij ; j < i I i D 1; : : : ; 4;
ln.li i /; i D 1; : : : ; 4:
The ￿ij parameters are continuous differentiable functions of the standard deviations
and correlation coefficients of the unobservables .￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i /0. But, the ￿ij are
not restricted and could take any value. The remaining parameters in ‚, i.e., the direct
returns to the choice variables, ￿a; ￿h; ￿y ; ￿￿ , and the complementarity parameters, ıah,
ıay , ıhy , are not restricted.
The above transformations define a function between the unrestricted parameter vector
‚￿ D .￿a, ￿h, ￿y , ￿￿ , ıah, ıay , ıhy , ', ￿11, ￿21, ￿22, ￿31, ￿32, ￿33, ￿41, ￿42, ￿43,
￿44/
0 and‚:
(A34) ‚ D c.‚￿/:
The log-likelihood function can finally be written as
(A35) lnLi .‚jxy i ;￿i ; xa i ; xh i / D
lnLi .c.‚￿/jxy i ;￿i ; xa i ; xh i / D lnL￿i .‚￿jxy i ;￿i ; xa i ; xh i /;
so that we obtain our estimates by maximizing lnL￿i with respect to b‚￿ and applying
the transformation b‚ D c.b‚￿/.
Simulations.—The simulations are performed by drawing ‚￿.r/ from a multivariate
normal distribution with mean b‚￿ and a cluster-robust covariance matrix estimator of
38 KRETSCHMER, MIRAVETE, AND PERNÍAS
b‚￿. For each draw of the parameter vector,‚.r/ D c￿‚￿.r/￿, we perform random draws
of .￿a i ; ￿h i ; ￿y i ; ￿￿ i /0 for every observation in the sample, using a multivariate normal
distribution with mean 0 and covariance matrix †.r/ obtained from the corresponding
elements of ‚.r/. Finally, with these simulated sample of the unobservables we solve
for the values of the endogenous variables xa i ; xh i ; xy i ;￿i , as discussed in Section II.
This procedure allows us to compute the expected change in the endogenous variables
that result from changes in exogenous variables that are discussed in Section III.C. For
each scenario we used 2;000 different parameter vectors and for each of those draws
we generate 150 random samples. In this way, we take into account the impact of the
estimation uncertainty into the simulation results.
